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PREEMPTIVE DICTA: THE PROBLEM 
CREATED BY JUDICIAL EFFICIENCY 
Judith M. Stinson*
           Judges regularly espouse dicta. Traditional obiter dicta, 
remarks that are clearly asides and not about issues considered in the 
case, can be easily ignored by subsequent courts. But one particular form 
of dicta is especially problematic because it is more difficult to ignore. 
Judicial efficiency dicta are statements in judicial opinions about issues 
involved in the case and likely to present themselves again, but not 
necessary for the outcome of the case. While those statements are often 
about issues actually considered and may contribute to judicial efficiency 
by saving courts time when reconsidering issues already litigated, just 
like obiter dicta, judicial efficiency dicta exceed courts’ authority and 
are more likely than actual case holdings to be incorrect. Unlike obiter 
dicta, however, judicial efficiency dicta are difficult to identify. And most 
significantly, this particular form of dicta is more likely to be followed by 
subsequent courts, essentially being elevated to the position of holdings. 
Because it is more likely to become binding and cut off the natural 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Much has been written about the problems dictum creates,1 and 
almost all courts and commentators agree that dicta, as opposed to case 
holdings, are not binding.2 Despite this, judges regularly espouse 
dicta.3 Yet little attention is paid to one particular type of dicta: that 
espoused for the purposes of judicial efficiency. 
Judicial efficiency dicta are statements made in judicial opinions 
about issues involved in the case that are likely to present themselves 
in the future, but these statements are not necessary for the outcome 
of the particular case before the court.4 Those statements may 
contribute to judicial efficiency by saving courts time when 
reconsidering issues already litigated.5 If those issues were actually 
raised before the court, this type of dicta would fall into the category 
of “considered dicta.”6 These statements are contrasted with what is 
commonly thought of as dicta—obiter dicta.7 Obiter dicta are those 
off-handed statements about issues not directly before the court, and 
they are generally easy to identify; they are also more easily dismissed 
than considered dicta.8 
Judicial efficiency is a laudable goal.9 Furthermore, when 
espousing dicta for judicial efficiency purposes, the court has likely 
considered the issue addressed (at least on some level), and some 
 
 1. See generally Michael Abramowicz & Maxwell Stearns, Defining Dicta, 57 STAN. L. REV. 
953 (2005) (analyzing the interplay between dicta and stare decisis); Michael C. Dorf, Dicta and 
Article III, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1997 (1994) (focusing on “the jurisprudential implications of Article 
III for determining how federal courts ought to distinguish between the holdings and dicta of past 
cases”); Pierre N. Leval, Judging Under the Constitution: Dicta About Dicta, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
1249 (2006) (discussing “the increasing failure of courts to distinguish between dictum and 
holding”); Judith M. Stinson, Why Dicta Becomes Holding and Why It Matters, 76 BROOK. L. REV. 
219 (2010) (aiming to “identify the causes that lead to the repeated conflation of dicta with 
holding”). 
 2. See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REV. 571, 573 (1987) (“So long as 
the words of the past tell us how to view the deeds of the past, it remains difficult to isolate how 
much of the effect of a past decision is attributable to what a past court has done rather than to what 
it has said.”); Leval, supra note 1, at 1274 (arguing that even the “Supreme Court’s dicta are not 
law” because the issues addressed in the dicta “remain unadjudicated”). 
 3. See, e.g., Leval, supra note 1, at 1250; David Klein & Neal Devins, Dicta, Schmicta: 
Theory Versus Practice in Lower Court Decision Making, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2021, 2048 
(2013). 
 4. See infra notes 33–55 and accompanying text. 
 5. See infra notes 146–50 and accompanying text. 
 6. See, e.g., Lisa M. Durham Taylor, Parsing Supreme Court Dicta to Adjudicate Non-
Workplace Harms, 57 DRAKE L. REV. 75, 93–94 (2008). 
 7. Marc McAllister, Dicta Redefined, 47 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 161, 167 (2011). 
 8. Taylor, supra note 6, at 90–94. 
 9. See infra notes 131–45 and accompanying text. 
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arguments were likely made by the parties.10 Hence, at first blush, this 
form of dicta is arguably more likely to be accurate than traditional 
obiter dicta because the statements often relate to issues actually 
considered by the court, and many argue that it is the least problematic 
type of dicta.11 This argument is misplaced, however. 
Because judicial efficiency dicta are unnecessary to the outcome 
of the case, these statements, just like obiter dicta, exceed courts’ 
authority by having judges essentially legislate the results in future 
disputes not before them.12 These statements are also, as with obiter 
dicta, more likely than actual case holdings to be incorrect because 
they do not impact the result.13 In addition to suffering from the same 
problems as other forms of dicta, the conventional wisdom suggesting 
that this type of dicta is less problematic than traditional obiter dicta 
ignores one key fact: judicial efficiency dicta essentially bind judges 
in future proceedings. 
When courts espouse these dicta in an attempt to provide 
guidance to the parties and future courts, the consequences are 
significant. The first problem is that subsequent courts are not likely 
to identify these statements as dicta14 and will therefore treat them as 
though they are binding—even though the issues were never properly 
before the court. Judges and scholars regularly comment on the 
difficulty in distinguishing between a court’s holding and dictum,15 
but judicial efficiency dicta are even more difficult to identify because 
they seem to be “rules” and often look like the considered judgment 
of the court, as opposed to the type of off-handed comments more 
easily labeled as dicta. 
And even if the subsequent court identifies the statements as dicta 
and therefore recognizes it has the power to ignore them, the court also 
would recognize that doing so would be unwise. Courts will be 
reluctant to deviate from the espoused dicta in part because individuals 
may have relied on those statements,16 and even though those 
 
 10. McAllister, supra note 7, at 167. 
 11. See infra note 27. 
 12. See infra notes 60–85 and accompanying text. 
 13. See infra notes 86–96 and accompanying text. 
 14. See infra notes 152–61 and accompanying text. 
 15. See, e.g., Larry Alexander, Constrained by Precedent, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 25 (1989) 
(noting, with regard to the “distinction between holding and dictum,” that “all lawyers are trained 
to acknowledge” the difference, but actually delineating dictum from holdings “proves in practice 
to be quite controversial”). 
 16. See infra notes 162–76 and accompanying text. 
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statements are not technically binding, lower courts may simply defer 
to higher courts17 and will be loath to rule contrary to the previous 
dicta because doing so will very likely result in reversal.18 Therefore, 
because judicial efficiency dicta are most likely to cut off debate, stunt 
the natural progression of the law, and become binding, this 
“preemptive dicta”—dicta espoused for the purpose of judicial 
efficiency—is, in fact, a very troublesome form of dicta. 
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part II defines dicta and 
summarizes the rationales for treating dicta differently than case 
holdings. It also explores the roles of various state and federal courts, 
including trial courts, appellate courts, and supreme courts, and 
explains the need for judicial efficiency. Part III explains why dicta 
espoused for judicial efficiency purposes, which I term “preemptive 
dicta,” intuitively appear less problematic than other forms of dicta. 
This Part demonstrates that in fact, this form of dicta should be 
considered some of the most troubling. Part IV concludes by 
suggesting a means of eliminating (or at least reducing) preemptive 
dicta and its harmful effects on the full and considered development 
of the law. 
II.  DICTA, COURTS’ ROLES, AND JUDICIAL EFFICIENCY 
The distinction between holdings and dicta is significant because 
of the interdependent nature of our court system. When subsequent 
courts follow dictum as though it was the law, they upset foundational 
principles about the roles various levels of courts fulfill within our 
democracy. Despite this, the need for judicial efficiency results in 
judges regularly espousing dicta.19 
A.  Dicta 
Dicta is generally defined as those parts of a judicial opinion that 
are not necessary to the result.20 Dictum is the opposite of a court’s 
holding.21 And although in theory only one holding is necessary to the 
 
 17. See infra notes 177–94 and accompanying text. 
 18. See infra notes 195–203 and accompanying text. 
 19. McAllister, supra note 7, at 205–06. 
 20. See, e.g., Dorf, supra note 1, at 2003; Kent Greenawalt, Reflections on Holding and 
Dictum, 39 J. LEGAL EDUC. 431, 435 (1989); McAllister, supra note 7, at 166; Stinson, supra note 
1, at 223–33, 236–40. 
 21. See, e.g., Abramowicz & Stearns, supra note 1, at 961 (“If not a holding, a proposition 
stated in a case counts as dicta.”); James Hardisty, Reflections on Stare Decisis, 55 IND. L.J. 41, 58 
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result of a case, for purposes of this Article, alternative holdings 
should be treated as holdings as long as the outcome of each 
alternative holding is the same. This is consistent with the view of 
most scholars.22 If the court purports to issue holdings that would 
result in conflicting outcomes, however—reverse for one reason, for 
example, yet affirm for a different reason—the “holding” that conflicts 
with the outcome is dictum and should have no precedential value. Of 
course, limiting an opinion to only those statements absolutely 
necessary to the outcome of the case is difficult, and most 
commentators agree that distinguishing between holding and dictum 
is easier in theory than in practice.23 
There are two main types of dicta: obiter dicta and considered 
dicta. Obiter dictum is what many think of when they hear the word 
“dicta”—those off-handed statements about what the outcome of the 
case would be if the facts were different.24 This common form of dicta 
is relatively easy to identify, and courts tend to afford these statements 
no deference.25 
Contrasted with traditional obiter dicta is considered dicta,26 
sometimes referred to as judicial dicta.27 Considered dicta are those 
statements made about issues the court actually considered, but 
because of the court’s ultimate ruling, those issues—and hence, those 
statements—are not necessary to the outcome of the case.28 These 
 
(1979) (describing the “customary usage” of every rule in a legal opinion being either holding or 
dictum); McAllister, supra note 7, at 166; Bradley Scott Shannon, Overruled by Implication, 33 
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 151, 175 (2009). 
 22. See, e.g., Abramowicz & Stearns, supra note 1, at 959, 969 (noting the “general 
understanding” is that “alternative holdings in a case all count as holdings” and labelling these as 
“alternative possible justifications,” suggesting they all support the same result); Dorf, supra note 
1, at 2044 (arguing that “judicial accuracy will not be undermined” by treating both alternative 
holdings as precedent). But see McAllister, supra note 7, at 166 (arguing that one form of dicta 
includes “statements that represent alternative grounds for a decision”). 
 23. See, e.g., Alexander, supra note 15, at 25; Note, Dictum Revisited, 4 STAN. L. REV. 509, 
509 (1952) (“Every lawyer thinks he knows what [dictum] means, yet few lawyers think much 
more about it. Nonthinking and overuse combine to make for fuzziness.”). 
 24. McAllister, supra note 7, at 167. 
 25. KARL LLEWELLYN, THE CASE LAW SYSTEM IN AMERICA 14 (Paul Gewirtz ed., Michael 
Ansaldi trans., 1989); McAllister, supra note 7, at 167; Taylor, supra note 6, at 93–94. 
 26. Taylor, supra note 6, at 93–94. 
 27. See, e.g., David Coale & Wendy Couture, Loud Rules, 34 PEPP. L. REV. 715, 727–28 
(2007); McAllister, supra note 7, at 167 (noting that judicial dicta “are the product of a more 
comprehensive discussion of legal issues, and usually involve points briefed and argued by the 
parties”). 
 28. Taylor, supra note 6, at 93–94. 
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statements are still clearly dicta.29 Yet because they concern issues 
actually considered by the court, they tend to have much more impact 
on future decisions than obiter dicta.30 Some argue considered dicta 
“should not be ignored, and are even entitled to great weight,”31 and 
at least one commentator argues that in the absence of conflicting 
indications of the law, considered dicta may “be regarded as 
conclusive.”32 
This Article focuses on a particular form of dicta—that espoused 
for purposes of judicial efficiency. Appellate courts are often faced 
with similar errors again and again; rather than simply addressing the 
narrow issue presented and explaining how the lower court “got it 
wrong,” it may save judicial resources to articulate how the lower 
courts can “get it right.”33 Yet the case where the lower court “got it 
right” is not before the appellate court, and hence, those statements are 
dicta. They are quite often considered dicta, but they are still dicta and 
for the reasons explained below, they are still problematic. 
Here is a concrete example of an appellate court generating this 
“judicial efficiency” dicta. In State v. Kelly,34 the New Jersey Supreme 
Court reversed a lower court decision and remanded for a new trial 
because the trial court refused to permit testimony by an expert 
 
 29. Coale & Couture, supra note 27, at 727–28; McAllister, supra note 7, at 167–68. 
 30. Taylor, supra note 6, at 93–94 (noting that “the various gradations of dicta might best be 
envisioned on a spectrum, with the left end comprised of the court’s offhand remarks and side 
comments, referred to by some as obiter dicta, and the right end occupied by the court’s reasoned 
conclusions about the law, often labeled judicial dicta or considered dicta” and pointing out that 
the “further a particular statement of dictum falls toward the right end of the spectrum, the more 
likely it is to garner future precedential effect” (footnotes omitted)); McAllister, supra note 7, at 
167–68. 
 31. Goodson v. United States, 151 F. Supp. 416, 420 (D. Minn. 1957) (citations omitted) (“The 
dicta we have considered here are dicta which the Minnesota court considered, and, therefore, they 
are entitled to great weight and should be followed unless it can be shown that there is good reason 
why the Minnesota court would not follow them when presented with the issue.”); United States v. 
Bell, 524 F.2d 202, 206 (2d Cir. 1975) (citations omitted) (“[A] distinction should be drawn 
between ‘obiter dictum,’ which constitutes an aside or an unnecessary extension of comments, and 
considered or ‘judicial dictum’ where the Court, as in this case, is providing a construction of a 
statute to guide the future conduct of inferior courts. While such dictum is not binding upon us, it 
must be given considerable weight and cannot be ignored in the resolution of the close question we 
have to decide.” (footnotes omitted)); Christopher R. Green, Originalism and the Sense-Reference 
Distinction, 50 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 555, 589 (2006) (arguing that considered dicta “are properly given 
substantial, even controlling, weight”). 
 32. CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & MARY KAY KANE, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 395 (7th ed. 
2011). 
 33. The efficiency rationale becomes even more compelling when individuals impacted by the 
lower courts’ errors are incarcerated. 
 34. 478 A.2d 364 (N.J. 1984). 
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witness.35 The defendant was charged with murder, claimed self-
defense, and sought to introduce expert testimony about the battered-
woman’s syndrome to support her self-defense claim.36 The trial court 
determined the expert testimony was irrelevant and therefore refused 
to permit it, and the appellate court affirmed.37 
The state’s supreme court reversed, holding that the testimony 
was relevant,38 that the defendant should have been given the 
opportunity to demonstrate the proposed witness was qualified as an 
expert,39 and that the testimony satisfied the appropriate standard for 
scientific evidence.40 Rather than simply remanding to the lower court, 
however, the court spent another half page explaining the limits on 
that testimony with this introduction: “Since a retrial is necessary, we 
think it advisable to indicate the limit of the expert’s testimony on this 
issue of reasonableness.”41 Despite no testimony ever being offered at 
trial, the court then explained what opinions the expert could state and 
what opinions she could not state.42 
Because the expert witness was not allowed to testify at trial , 
however, the court’s direction to the trial court in terms of permissible 
and impermissible testimony was dicta. It may have been considered 
dicta, although it is not clear how much information the court had on 
this issue because the witness was precluded from testifying. And it is 
 
 35. Id. at 368. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. at 379. 
 39. Id. at 380–81. 
 40. Id. at 380–82. 
 41. Id. at 378. These types of pronouncements are not limited to state supreme courts. The 
Arizona Court of Appeals reversed a defendant’s armed robbery conviction on procedural grounds, 
but added this judicial efficiency dicta: “While this case must be reversed for failure to impanel a 
twelve member jury, we address ourselves to appellant’s second issue because of the probability of 
reoccurrence upon retrial.” State v. Miguel, 611 P.2d 125, 128 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1980). The court 
then went on to state that where “the evidence establishes beyond a reasonable doubt that the victim 
did not in fact consent to the taking of his property, and that he was physically unable to give such 
consent, whether from voluntary or involuntary causes, it will be presumed that the taking was 
against the victim’s will”—indicating their approval of the conviction on substantive grounds, 
despite reversing his convictions. Id. at 129. 
 42. Kelly, 478 A.2d at 378. Furthermore, the court spent an additional four pages addressing 
other claims by the defendant and began that portion of the opinion with this caveat: “Although our 
disposition of this case makes it unnecessary to consider” five additional issues raised by the 
defendant, “we dispose of them briefly to assist the trial court in the event they surface again at the 
new trial.” Id. at 382. The court then declared two additional points of error, which could easily be 
classified as alternative holdings. Id. at 382–85. The court also, however, expressed its agreement 
with the trial court on the three other claims, despite those issues contradicting the outcome of the 
case. Id. at 383–85. 
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quite understandable why the New Jersey Supreme Court would seek 
to provide guidance to the lower court in this case: the defendant had 
been convicted of a crime and sentenced to five years in prison43 and 
was presumably serving that sentence while this appeal was pending. 
It took four years for the court to reverse and remand the case for a 
new trial.44 The trial court and appellate courts were wrong, and the 
state supreme court decided to tell them how to do it “right.” But in 
doing so, the court espoused dicta, and that is problematic. 
This “judicial efficiency dictum” is also present in trial court 
opinions.45 For example, a federal district court dismissed a case 
without prejudice and ostensibly expected the case to be refiled.46 In 
Rannels v. Hargrove,47 the plaintiff sued the Pennsylvania Secretary 
of Banking, alleging that a Pennsylvania bank violated a number of 
laws including the federal Age Discrimination Act (ADA) by 
providing a higher interest rate to customers over the age of fifty.48 
The defendant moved to dismiss some claims on jurisdictional 
grounds and others for failure to state a claim.49 The court granted the 
defendant’s motion and dismissed the case, allowing the plaintiff 
thirty days to file an amended complaint.50 
Despite dismissing the suit, the trial court spent over a page 
discussing whether the ADA prohibits “reverse age discrimination,”51 
meaning whether the Act protects young people against discrimination 
as well as older persons.52 The opinion expressly states the following: 
“I thus hold that the ADA covers discrimination on the basis of age, 
 
 43. Id. at 385. 
 44. Id. at 364, 381. 
 45. Judicial efficiency dicta espoused by trial courts are, of course, less problematic than dicta 
espoused by appellate courts because subsequent courts will never be technically bound to follow 
the rules articulated by the trial court. But those statements can still impact the ultimate results in 
that particular case and, consistent with appellate court dicta, can influence the development of the 
law; in addition to failing to identify the earlier statements as dicta, later courts may acknowledge 
that the trial judge making the statements considered the issue, especially in the same court or 
district, and may face pressure to be consistent. Party reliance is extreme here, and the judge later 
would be very unlikely to change the result. This is true even though the statements were not 
necessary to the initial decision and hence, exceeded the court’s authority in the first instance and 
are more likely to be inaccurate. For these reasons, even trial court judicial efficiency dicta are 
problematic, as they still can cut off the natural development of the law. 
 46. Rannels v. Hargrove, 731 F. Supp. 1214, 1227 n.19 (E.D. Pa. 1990). 
 47. 731 F. Supp. 1214 (E.D. Pa. 1990). 
 48. Id. at 1216. 
 49. Id. at 1216–17. 
 50. Id. at 1217, 1226–27. 
 51. Id. at 1220; see id. 1220–21. 
 52. Id. at 1220. 
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whether against the old or the young, and hence encompasses Rannels’ 
claim.”53 The next three paragraphs of the opinion, however, explain 
that because the plaintiff’s complaint did not allege he had exhausted 
his administrative remedies, “I shall therefore dismiss his ADA 
claims.”54 
Because the court expressly dismissed the ADA claim, the entire 
discussion about reverse age discrimination was not necessary to the 
outcome of the case and was therefore dicta.55 It was considered dicta, 
as opposed to merely obiter dicta—but dicta nonetheless. Because the 
plaintiff could refile the case, it is understandable that the trial court 
would want to provide some guidance. But in light of the express 
outcome of the case—dismissal—the entire discussion and purported 
“holding” on the issue of whether reverse discrimination violates the 
ADA was unnecessary. 
Most courts and commentators agree that dictum is problematic,56 
and it is not binding.57 Although there is substantial debate about 
where the precise holding/dictum line should be drawn,58 even under 
the most liberal definition of “holding” (and hence, most restrictive 
 
 53. Id. at 1221 (emphasis added). 
 54. Id. The opinion stated that due to the lack of exhaustion, the court “lack[ed] jurisdiction 
over the ADA claims,” although it is not entirely clear that the statutory requirement to exhaust 
ADA’s administrative remedies is jurisdictional. Id. The court also, in an alternative holding, 
concluded it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the ADA claim because the plaintiff failed to 
allege that the defendant received federal funding, a requirement of the statute. Id. at 1221–23. 
 55. The court’s purported holding that the ADA prohibits reverse age discrimination does not 
fit within the “alternative holdings” category because the outcome on that issue directly contradicts 
the outcome on the ADA claim—dismissal. See supra note 22 and accompanying text. 
 56. See, e.g., Cetacean Cmty. v. Bush, 386 F.3d 1169, 1173–74 (9th Cir. 2004); Patel v. Sun 
Co., 141 F.3d 447, 462 (3d Cir. 1998); United States v. Crawley, 837 F.2d 291, 292 (7th Cir. 1988); 
Alexander, supra note 15, at 25; Dorf, supra note 1, at 2000–05; Greenawalt, supra note 20, at 
433–34. 
 57. See, e.g., Crawley, 837 F.2d at 292 (explaining that “a dictum is not authoritative” and “is 
the part of an opinion that a later court, even if it is an inferior court, is free to reject”); Abramowicz 
& Stearns, supra note 1, at 957; Dorf, supra note 1, at 2004; Leval, supra note 1, at 1250, 1259. 
Dicta can, of course, be persuasive, as can any well-reasoned argument, regardless of its source. 
Dorf, supra note 1, at 2053 n.199. 
 58. The arguments range from “the actual holding must be stated quite narrowly: The holding 
is no more than the precise point at issue (rarely all issues in a dispute) that the case decided, either 
for the plaintiff or the defendant,” LLEWELLYN, supra note 25, at 14, to “statements that are not 
asides should be treated as a spectrum or scalar.” Andrew C. Michaels, The Holding-Dictum 
Spectrum, 70 ARK. L. REV. 661, 664, 688–93 (2017). A number of additional formulations exists; 
as noted by one scholar, “[u]nder a strict interpretation, the only statement truly necessary to decide 
a case is the order of the court, which potentially makes the entire opinion dicta.” McAllister, supra 
note 7, at 168; see also CHARLES R. CALLEROS & KIMBERLY Y.W. HOLST, LEGAL METHOD AND 
WRITING I: PREDICTIVE WRITING 267 (8th ed. 2018) (stating the holding, “[n]arrowly defined, . . . 
is the court’s resolution of an issue before it, limited to the material facts of that dispute”). 
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view of dicta),59 failure to distinguish between a court’s holding and 
the dictum espoused by that court—even considered dictum, including 
judicial efficiency dictum—creates a significant problem for two 
reasons: it exceeds the court’s judicial authority, and it is less likely to 
be accurate. 
1.  Dicta Exceed the Court’s Authority 
All dicta exceed the courts’ authority.60 Most dictum is likely 
unintentional, but some instances of judicial efficiency dicta may be 
what has been described as “judicial dicta-planting,”61 whereby judges 
intentionally “plant dicta into their opinions to subtly influence the 
law’s development.”62 Judicial dicta-planting “will continue precisely 
because it is effective.”63 
Dicta exceed courts’ authority even when the reasons for 
espousing the dictum are understandable and the result of good 
intentions.64 Our common law system demands an incremental 
approach to the law.65 The law develops progressively, in steps, from 
one issue to another until, over time, broader principles—rules—
 
 59. Arguably, in debates about where the holding/dicta line should be drawn, the wise course 
is to err on the side of calling the questionable statements dicta; subsequent courts would still be 
free to adopt that rule, but this would prevent courts from deciding issues not properly before them, 
increasing the likely accuracy of judicial decision and preventing courts from exceeding their 
authority. Regardless of where that line is drawn, however, the thesis of this Article remains 
unchanged: dicta espoused for purposes of judicial efficiency, preemptive dicta, is one of the most 
problematic forms of dicta. 
 60. See, e.g., Alexander, supra note 15, at 14 (arguing that precedent courts have “authority 
only to decide cases and no authority to legislate rules binding on other courts”); Dorf, supra note 
1, at 2067 (acknowledging that the “case-or-controversy norms rooted in notions of limited judicial 
legitimacy and competence counsel against giving the judiciary carte blanche to pronounce 
authoritative rules of conduct outside the context of a concrete case” and therefore, “the tension 
between the demands of the rule of law and the limits of judicial authority produces the need for a 
holding/dictum distinction”); Leval, supra note 1, at 1263 (“Among the most common 
manifestations of disguised dictum occurs where the court ventures beyond the issue in controversy 
to declare the solution to a further problem—one that will arise in another case, or in a later phase 
of the same case.”). 
 61. McAllister, supra note 7, at 176 (“Not only do judges have little to lose by the use of dicta, 
they also have much to gain. Once a dictum has been planted, it is likely to achieve its desired 
effect. History shows that dicta are not lightly disregarded, and that courts frequently cite to and 
rely upon dicta as support for their holdings.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 62. Id. at 177. 
 63. Id. 
 64. See supra note 33 and accompanying text. 
 65. Klein & Devins, Dicta, Schmicta, supra note 3, at 2029 (“[T]he more strictly courts 
distinguish between holding and dictum, the more closely we can expect the system of precedent 
to correspond to a traditional view of common law judging. In this view, the law-making power of 
the precedent-setting court is more circumscribed, and law develops more flexibly.”). 
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emerge.66 This occurs within the context of courts’ mandate to resolve 
particular, individual cases.67 Espousing dictum that circumvents or 
expedites that natural progression of the law is beyond the authority 
of the courts. Judges must therefore be especially wary of exceeding 
their authority.68 And in appropriate situations, legislatures can 
intervene if there is a will to change the law that is developing in the 
courts.69 Because the statements are not needed to resolve the case or 
controversy before the court, they are not necessary to the result and a 
court exceeds its authority by espousing dictum, whether for judicial 
efficiency purposes or otherwise.70 
That dictum becomes especially problematic when it is blindly 
followed by a subsequent court. In that instance, the earlier court has 
exceeded its judicial authority,71 and the subsequent court has 
abdicated its judicial authority.72 Separation of powers principles 
dictate that courts are empowered to resolve the cases before them, 
and legislatures are empowered to enact prospective laws.73 Despite 
 
 66. Id. at 2026. 
 67. See, e.g., Abramowicz & Stearns, supra note 1, at 1018–19 (agreeing with the proposition 
that “the legal system should restrain judges from conclusively resolving issues not meaningfully 
presented by the material facts of the particular case”). 
 68. See infra notes 71–85 and accompanying text. 
 69. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME 
COURT 118 (1999); Abramowicz & Stearns, supra note 1, at 1066 (concluding that the authors’ 
analysis “is consistent with the premises that courts and legislatures have distinct lawmaking 
functions and that judicial decisionmaking is legitimated by the passive quality of resolving cases 
presented by actual litigants”). 
 70. McAllister, supra note 7, at 183 (“By dismissing the disputed issues as superfluous, yet 
extensively commenting upon those very issues, the majority’s opinion is reminiscent of an 
unwarranted advisory opinion.”). 
 71. Leval, supra note 1, at 1250 (“[J]udges regularly undertake to promulgate law through 
utterance of dictum made to look like a holding—in disguise, so to speak. When we do so, we seek 
to exercise a lawmaking power that we do not rightfully possess.”). 
 72. Id. (“[Judges] accept dictum uttered in a previous opinion as if it were binding law, which 
governs our subsequent adjudication. When we do so, we fail to discharge our responsibility to 
deliberate on and decide the question which needs to be decided.”). 
 73. See, e.g., Dorf, supra note 1, at 2003 (noting that “both the adversary system and the 
premise that courts have less authority to prescribe general-purpose rules than do legislatures are 
so firmly rooted in American legal practice as to rank as axiomatic” (footnote omitted)); Michael 
S. Moore, A Natural Law Theory of Interpretation, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 277, 314 (1985) (“The 
separation of powers slogan is in fact a label for three different political ideals. All three share the 
common conclusion that the legislature should make the laws and the courts merely apply them. 
Each of these ideals reached this conclusion a bit differently, however.”); Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., 
Justiciability and Separation of Powers: A Neo-Federalist Approach, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 393, 
400–03 (1996). 
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judges not having legislative powers,74 when they control future 
disputes with their dicta, they are for all practical purposes 
legislating.75 In addition to legislatures being the appropriate body to 
enact prospective laws, legislatures occupy a better position in which 
to do this. They can hold hearings, hear from a variety of experts, and 
seek broad input from an array of stakeholders.76 They can consider 
future disputes beyond the confines of a narrow case that may come 
before a particular judge based on one controversy, where the 
information presented is specifically limited to that case. 
It is true, of course, that our common law system results in courts 
creating binding law;77 in order to not exceed their inherent authority, 
however, that law should be limited to the specific issue necessary to 
resolve the case before that court.78 A basic tenet of our common law 
system is that courts may decide the issues properly before them and 
only those issues.79 Because stare decisis results in judicial opinions 
having an impact broader than just on the litigants directly involved in 
the case, judges should be cognizant of the potential reach of their 
purported rulings.80 For stare decisis to have any validity, judges must 
refrain from attempting to resolve issues not necessary to the outcome 
of the cases directly before them. This “judicial minimalism” approach 
avoids many of the problems inherent in the use of dicta; it also helps 
 
 74. See, e.g., Lawrence M. Solan, Precedent in Statutory Interpretation, 94 N.C. L. REV. 1165, 
1230 (2016) (arguing that to avoid usurping the legislative role when interpreting statutes, judges 
considering previous judicial opinions should “separate holding and dicta along traditional lines”). 
 75. But see Shawn J. Bayern, Case Interpretation, 36 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 125, 150 (2009) 
(arguing that the holding/dictum distinction does not serve the goal of limiting courts’ power). 
 76. See, e.g., Philip P. Frickey & Steven S. Smith, Judicial Review, the Congressional 
Process, and the Federalism Cases: An Interdisciplinary Critique, 111 YALE L.J. 1707, 1733–35 
(2002) (discussing the extensive information, both through formal channels and informal channels, 
available to legislators and noting that “the information cumulates over many years, often, if not 
typically, long before a particular measure is debated and enacted”). 
 77. See infra note 91 and accompanying text. 
 78. See, e.g., Abramowicz & Stearns, supra note 1, at 1021–23 (noting that the distinction 
between holding and dicta should serve two functions: “delaying resolution of issues until judges 
can properly consider them and encouraging judges to focus on the issues before them”); Stinson, 
supra note 1, at 228. But see LEE EPSTEIN ET AL., THE BEHAVIOR OF FEDERAL JUDGES: A 
THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL STUDY OF RATIONAL CHOICE 26–30 (2013) (“It has long been 
understood that American judges exercise, at least occasionally (and at the Supreme Court level 
much more than occasionally), a legislative or policymaking role . . . . ”). 
 79. LLEWELLYN, supra note 25, at 14. 
 80. Leval, supra note 1, at 1259 (“[I]t was not the purpose of stare decisis to increase court 
power. To the contrary, the rule was intended as a limitation on the courts. It was designed to keep 
courts principled and consistent—to prevent courts from acting arbitrarily or capriciously . . . . ” 
(emphasis omitted)). 
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ensure judges do not exceed their authority.81 This allows lower courts 
to develop the law incrementally, on a case-by-case basis, as many 
argue the common law system intended.82 
And when federal court judges promulgate dicta by fashioning 
rules unnecessary for the outcome of the case, they exceed their 
constitutional authority.83 Article III expressly limits judges’ power to 
“Cases” and “Controversies.”84 They cannot create law beyond the 
confines of the case-or-controversy requirement.85 Although this 
constitutional restriction admittedly does not apply to state courts, the 
problems described above still exist—and are significant—when state 
court judges issue dicta. 
2.  Dicta Are More Likely to Be Inaccurate than Holdings 
In terms of accuracy, dictum is less likely to be accurate than the 
court’s actual holding.86 When judges espouse dicta—even for reasons 
of judicial efficiency, and even when the court has actually considered 
the issue—they are simply more likely to be inaccurate because the 
statements have no impact on the outcome of the case.87 “[W]hen 
 
 81. SUNSTEIN, supra note 69, at 3–4. But see Dorf, supra note 1, at 2005–09 (distinguishing 
between an “aside,” which would violate Article III, and rationales reflected in statements of “legal 
principle broader than the narrowest proposition that can decide the case,” which he argues can be 
legitimate); Tara Leigh Grove, The Structural Case for Vertical Maximalism, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 
1, 7 (2009) (arguing that the United States Supreme Court’s opinions ought to reach broadly for a 
variety of reasons). 
 82. See, e.g., Klein & Devins, Dicta, Schmicta, supra note 3, at 2027, 2031–32 (commenting 
that when the holding/dictum distinction is preserved, the “system of precedent” corresponds to a 
“traditional view of common law judging” where the “law-making power of the precedent-setting 
court is more circumscribed, and law develops more flexibly”). 
 83. But see Dorf, supra note 1, at 1998 (defending “a view of the holding/dictum distinction 
that attributes special significance to the rationales of prior cases, rather than just their facts and 
outcomes” and therefore concluding broad statements about the rationale for a decision would 
generally not violate Article III (emphasis omitted)). 
 84. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. 
 85. F. Andrew Hessick, Cases, Controversies, and Diversity, 109 NW. U. L. REV. 57, 91 
(2015) (arguing that the Supreme Court views “the case or controversy provisions of Article III” 
as “‘defin[ing] the role assigned to the judiciary in a tripartite allocation of power’ among the 
judiciary, the President, and Congress”); McAllister, supra note 7, at 183. 
 86. Patel v. Sun Co., 141 F.3d 447, 462 n.11 (3d Cir. 1998) (positing that dicta should not be 
given weight because “it may not have been as fully considered as it would have been if it were 
essential to the outcome”); Dorf, supra note 1, at 2000 (describing accuracy as “the primary virtue 
that the holding/dictum distinction serves” according to Chief Justice Marshall). 
 87. United States v. Crawley, 837 F.2d 291, 292 (7th Cir. 1988) (“[I]nstead of asking what the 
word ‘dictum’ means we can ask what reasons there are against a court’s giving weight to a passage 
found in a previous opinion. . . . One is that the passage was unnecessary to the outcome of the 
earlier case and therefore perhaps not as fully considered as it would have been if it were essential 
to the outcome.”); Leval, supra note 1, at 1268 (“The dangers of dictum uttered without ‘paying 
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courts declare rules that have no consequence for the case, their 
cautionary mechanism is often not engaged. They are far more likely 
in these circumstances to fashion defective rules, and to assert 
misguided propositions, which have not been fully thought through.”88 
Judicial efficiency dicta may, of course, be accurate. But the 
likelihood of a more accurate decision increases when the statements 
are essential to the outcome and the result of the full adversarial 
process, developing over time and tested at each turn.89 When dicta 
impede this considered development of the law, the resulting rules are 
less likely to be correct.90 
As noted by Judge Leval, the conditions that “best favor 
lawmaking by courts are those where the dispute is framed by concrete 
facts. Two of the most difficult challenges in lawmaking are 
understanding the facts that call for regulation and understanding what 
effect the imposition of any rule will have on those facts.”91 On the 
other hand, “when a court asserts a rule of law in dictum, the court will 
often not have before it any facts affected by that rule. In addition, the 
lack of concrete facts increases the likelihood that readers will 
misunderstand the scope of the rule the court had in mind.”92 
Accuracy is also impacted by the nature of our adversarial system. 
That system depends on the parties fully advancing their own 
 
the price’ are also present . . . when the court asserts there was no error as to some of the claims on 
appeal, but ultimately goes on to reverse on another basis” because none of the “assertions affects 
the judgment. They come for free. Because they have no consequences for the judgment, such 
pronouncements are often glibly uttered, without careful scrutiny, and are therefore often 
mistaken.”); Stinson, supra note 1, at 225–26 (“Even when a court has thoroughly considered the 
issue, if the statement has no impact on the merits, a court is more likely to be wrong. In these 
instances, the court has less incentive to ensure the ‘correct’ decision because it is not binding on 
the parties before the court, much less future litigants.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 88. Leval, supra note 1, at 1263. 
 89. See, e.g., Abramowicz & Stearns, supra note 1, at 1049 (noting that “presumably the 
strongest argument” for limiting holdings to a facts-plus-outcome approach, and therefore defining 
non-binding dictum as those statements not necessary to the result, “is that its flexibility frees courts 
from strict adherence to the reasoning of their predecessors, thus allowing them to refine doctrine 
within a context of overall judicial constraint”). 
 90. Leval, supra note 1, at 1265 (positing that rather than creating new rules, “[w]ouldn’t the 
law have developed more sensibly had the Supreme Court simply decided cases as they arose?”). 
 91. Id. at 1262. Judge Leval adds that the accuracy of a decision depends on having those clear 
facts: “When the assertion of a proposition of law determines a case’s outcome, the court 
necessarily sees how that proposition functions in at least one factual context, at least with respect 
to the immediate result.” Id. 
 92. Id.; see also Abramowicz & Stearns, supra note 1, at 1021 (“[T]he expectation that judges 
explain how they reached their decisions encourages judges to pay considerable attention to those 
issues that are properly before them.”). 
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positions.93 Parties have less incentive to fully litigate a particular 
claim or issue, however, if it will not change the outcome.94 They may 
decide to not pursue all potentially relevant arguments or positions, 
and the court is therefore less likely to make a fully informed decision 
on that matter. 
The inability to challenge incorrect rulings also diminishes 
accuracy. When a judge’s statements are not necessary to the case’s 
outcome, the ability to challenge those statements on appeal is 
severely curtailed, if not completely eliminated.95 Litigants can only 
appeal adverse outcomes; therefore, even if the court’s statements on 
non-determinative issues were considered part of the court’s 
holding—and hence, binding on future courts—the prevailing party 
cannot appeal and has no incentive to appeal.96 
And accuracy matters. Our deliberative law-making process 
ensures more accurate rules. Stare decisis requires courts to follow the 
holdings of controlling courts,97 so the effects of dicta are magnified 
when a subsequent court treats those statements as a court’s actual 
holding. And courts regularly do follow dictum as if it were the law.98 
 
 93. See, e.g., Patel v. Sun Co., 141 F.3d 447, 462 n.11 (3d Cir. 1998) (noting that one of the 
reasons for not giving dictum weight is that “the dictum may lack refinement because it was not 
honed through the fires of an adversary presentation” (emphasis omitted)); Ellen E. Sward, Values, 
Ideology, and the Evolution of the Adversary System, 64 IND. L.J. 301, 316–17 (1989) (“When each 
side presents its best case, the decisionmaker has all the information he needs to reach a just result. 
When presentation of the case is left in the hands of the parties, the information- and motive-based 
rationales both suggest that each side will, indeed, present its best case.”). 
 94. Cost, for example, is a significant factor in litigation strategy, and litigation costs have 
been high for over fifty years. See, e.g., David M. Trubek et al., The Costs of Ordinary Litigation, 
31 UCLA L. REV. 72, 76–77 (1983). The likelihood that litigants will subject themselves to 
increased costs in order to pursue a claim that will not affect the outcome of their case is minimal 
at best. 
 95. Leval, supra note 1, at 1262 (“Another weakness of law made through dicta is there is no 
available correction mechanism. No appeal may be taken from the assertion of an erroneous legal 
rule in dictum.”). 
 96. Id. (“[N]o party has a motive to try to get the bad proposition corrected. No party will even 
ask the court to reconsider its unfortunate dicta.”). 
 97. Abramowicz & Stearns, supra note 1, at 957. 
 98. See, e.g., Klein & Devins, Dicta, Schmicta, supra note 3, at 2048 (“[T]he distinction 
between holding and dictum is at once central to the American legal system and largely irrelevant. 
Lawyers, judges, and academics refer to ‘dicta’ and ‘dictum’ all the time. But lower courts appear 
quite reluctant to rest decisions on the ground that dictum is not holding when it really matters.”). 
The authors conclude that the holding/dictum distinction has less importance in practice than in 
theory because lower courts appear to regularly follow higher-court dicta. Id.; see also Leval, supra 
note 1, at 1250 (“The problem is that dicta no longer have the insignificance they deserve. They are 
no longer ignored. Judges do more than put faith in them; they are often treated as binding law. The 
distinction between dictum and holding is more and more frequently disregarded.”). 
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B.  The Roles of Various Courts 
Just as the distinction between holdings and dicta helps ensure 
courts act consistent with their authority and decisions are accurate, 
the structure of courts in the United States provides procedures that 
promote the considered division of responsibilities and correct 
outcomes. Courts can only address the explicit issues before them.99 
Appellate courts cannot proactively assert prospective rules; they are 
required to allow the issues and factual records to develop in the lower 
courts prior to reaching a decision.100 This allows opportunities for a 
variety of well-conceived arguments to develop within a variety of 
factual contexts prior to the issues being ripe and being considered by 
a higher court. This slow, intentional, deliberative process is essential 
to our judicial model.101 
State trial courts are courts of general jurisdiction tasked with 
resolving disputes in the first instance.102 Federal trial courts are also 
the “courts of first instance in criminal and civil matters,”103 although 
federal jurisdiction must be established.104 State and federal trial court 
decisions are rarely published,105 and despite relatively high 
caseloads,106 the vast majority of cases filed in federal and state trial 
courts settle, often without significant substantive rulings by a 
judge.107 The increase in alternative dispute mechanisms such as 
 
 99. Dorf, supra note 1, at 1997. 
 100. Earl M. Maltz, The Function of Supreme Court Opinions, 37 HOUS. L. REV. 1395, 1402 
(2000). 
 101. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Wisconsin, 139 S. Ct. 2525, 2551 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) 
(noting that “the Court today declines to answer the question presented. Instead, it upholds 
Wisconsin’s law on an entirely different ground—citing the exigent circumstances doctrine.” 
Justice Gorsuch pointed out that the “exigent circumstances doctrine in this area poses complex 
and difficult questions that neither the parties nor the courts below discussed. Rather than 
proceeding solely by self-direction, I would have dismissed this case as improvidently granted and 
waited for a case presenting the exigent circumstances question”). 
 102. See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Parness, American General Jurisdiction Trial Courts: New Visions, 
New Guidelines, 55 U. KAN. L. REV. 189, 204 n.118 (2006); LLEWELLYN, supra note 25, at 32. 
 103. LLEWELLYN, supra note 25, at 27. 
 104. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330–1369 (2018); see also LLEWELLYN, supra note 25, at 27. 
 105. LLEWELLYN, supra note 25, at 32. 
 106. See infra notes 131–32 and accompanying text. 
 107. See, e.g., Marc Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and Don’t 
Know (And Think We Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L. 
REV. 4, 26–27 (1983) (noting that “30% of cases in American courts of general jurisdiction are not 
formally contested” and of those that are contested, the vast majority settle either through 
negotiation or mediation, especially criminal cases). Galanter argues that the “master pattern of 
American disputing is one in which there is actual or threatened invocation of an authoritative 
decision maker. This is countered by a threat of protracted or hard-fought resistance, leading to a 
negotiated or mediated settlement, often in the anteroom of the adjudicative institution.” Id. 
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arbitration108 and mediation109 has also impacted the role of trial 
courts. Despite these changes, trial court judges remain the pillars of 
our common law system; they hear the evidence, interact with the 
parties, instruct the juries, and develop the law—one case at a time.110 
This “quintessential common law judging,” where “the law evolves 
incrementally, sacrificing something of both speed and predictability 
in the hope of resting decisions on more solid ground,” requires that 
“trial judges frequently assert their prerogative to exercise 
independent judgment by distinguishing higher court precedent or 
invoking the holding-dicta distinction to limit its scope.”111 
Federal and state intermediate appellate courts, on the other hand, 
serve a markedly different role from trial courts.112 Appellate courts 
are error-correcting.113 Review by these courts is not discretionary,114 
and rather than reconsidering the case from scratch, appellate court 
review is limited to questions of law and factual issues only to the 
extent that they are supported by the record.115 State appellate courts 
 
 108. See generally Thomas J. Stipanowich, Arbitration: The “New Litigation”, 2010 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 1 (detailing the increasing use of arbitration). 
 109. See, e.g., Art Hinshaw, Regulating Mediators, 21 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 163, 170–72 
(2016) (“[M]ediation remains the undisputed dispute resolution method of choice for litigants, 
courts, administrative agencies, and major corporations.”). 
 110. Neal Devins & David Klein, The Vanishing Common Law Judge?, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 
595, 598 (2017) (describing the process of common law as the “decision in each case is a step in 
the growth of the law, a new datum for future reasoning” (emphasis omitted)). In addition to 
developing the common law, trial court judges spend significant time interpreting statutes and 
regulations; unless the legislature or agency amends that statute or regulation, the judge’s decision 
becomes part of the law on that point. See, e.g., Kevin M. Stack, Interpreting Regulations, 111 
MICH. L. REV. 355, 356–57 (2012). 
 111. Devins & Klein, The Vanishing Common Law Judge?, supra note 110, at 606. This allows 
trial courts to “importantly influence the direction in which and the speed with which the law 
develops.” Id. The authors contrast this with instances “when lower courts take an expansive view 
of precedent” and therefore “have a reduced ability to propose refinements to legal doctrine or to 
slow the pace at which it grows and solidifies. In such a system, law moves at the speed and with 
the shape dictated by higher courts; more errors and greater overbreadth are tolerated as the price 
for greater immediate certainty and more hierarchical control.” Id. 
 112. LLEWELLYN, supra note 25, at 32–33. 
 113. See, e.g., Christina L. Boyd, The Hierarchical Influence of Courts of Appeals on District 
Courts, 44 J. LEGAL STUD. 113, 135 (2015) (“[T]he motivations behind trial judging are very 
different from those behind appellate judging . . . .”). 
 114. Stefanie A. Lindquist, Bureaucratization and Balkanization: The Origins and Effects of 
Decision-Making Norms in the Federal Appellate Courts, 41 U. RICH. L. REV. 659, 659 (2007) 
(noting that federal courts of appeal “perform a critical function within the federal judicial system 
by providing litigants with an appeal as of right from decisions rendered in district courts and 
administrative agencies”). 
 115. LLEWELLYN, supra note 25, at 28, 32, 38. They can also determine whether a fact finding 
at the trial court level was “clearly erroneous,” but they cannot, in general, substitute their judgment 
for that of the trial court on findings of fact. Id. at 28. 
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are sometimes criticized for “dispensing a somewhat mechanical 
justice” based on the volume of cases they hear and the recognition 
that their state supreme court has the final say in correcting errors.116 
Federal circuit courts, on the other hand, are more heavily staffed,117 
and, for most practical purposes, are the courts of last resort for all but 
a very small percentage of litigants.118 State supreme courts also 
exercise an error-correcting function, and their review is generally 
discretionary.119 As with intermediate appellate courts, they only 
review, other than in narrow circumstances, questions of law.120 
Finally, although their function is somewhat akin to state supreme 
courts, the United States Supreme Court holds a unique position in the 
American justice system. First, it is primarily a constitutional court.121 
As such, its rulings significantly impact and restrict all state courts.122 
In addition, the Court hears fewer than ninety cases per year123 and 
focuses far more on policy than error correction.124 Debate over the 
Court’s proper role is plentiful,125 and many commentators argue that 
even dicta from the Supreme Court are binding.126 But as the final 
 
 116. Id. at 33. 
 117. See infra notes 142–43 and accompanying text. 
 118. Lindquist, supra note 114, at 659 (“[G]iven the Supreme Court’s limited docket, the circuit 
courts constitute the court of last resort in the federal system for the vast majority of appeals.”). 
 119. Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional Fact Review, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 229, 246 n.96 
(1985). 
 120. LLEWELLYN, supra note 25, at 33. 
 121. See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, More Supreme than Court? The Fall of the Political Question 
Doctrine and the Rise of Judicial Supremacy, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 237, 239–41 (2002) (“The 
Constitution is law; it is the Supreme Court’s province—its duty—to say what the law is; therefore 
it is the Supreme Court’s province and duty to answer all constitutional questions.” (emphasis 
omitted)); Thomas Healy, The Rise of Unnecessary Constitutional Rulings, 83 N.C. L. REV. 847, 
854 (2005). Although each state supreme court may set policy for that state, no state supreme court 
enjoys the breadth of power that the Supreme Court of the United States possesses. 
 122. Maltz, supra note 100, at 1402. 
 123. Grove, supra note 81, at 57. 
 124. See, e.g., Joseph Callanan, Rare Supreme Court Reversal for Error Correction, A.B.A. 
(Aug. 21, 2014), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/litigation/publications/litigation-news/top-
stories/2014/rare-supreme-court-reversal-for-error-correction/. 
 125. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Foreword: A Political Court, 119 HARV. L. REV. 31, 34–35 
(2005) (“[T]o the extent the Court is a constitutional court, it is a political body.”). 
 126. See, e.g., Maltz, supra note 100, at 1418–20; Frederick Schauer, Opinions as Rules, 53 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 682, 683 (1986) (reviewing BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS OF 
THE WARREN COURT (1985)) (“Fine distinctions between holding and dicta are rarely relevant; 
indeed, the very question of what the Court held at all becomes increasingly less important as we 
follow an opinion down the hierarchy. For when we are in the pit of actual application, we will 
discover that it is not what the Supreme Court held that matters, but what it said.”). At least one 
Justice, however, appears to be concerned by this claim: 
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court of review for all federal courts and state courts on federal law 
issues127 and by virtue of its supervisory power,128 the Court is at least 
arguably entitled to take a more expansive view of its role in defining 
federal law.129 For these reasons, this Article does not address judicial 
efficiency dicta issued by the Supreme Court.130 
 
I write separately to address the troubling dicta with which the Court concludes its 
opinion. . . . Given the majority’s ominous words about late-arising death penalty 
litigation . . . one might assume there is some legal question before us concerning 
delay. Make no mistake: There is not. The majority’s commentary on once and 
future stay applications is not only inessential but also wholly irrelevant to its 
resolution of any issue before us. 
Bucklew v. Precythe, 139 S. Ct. 1112, 1146 (2019) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 127. LLEWELLYN, supra note 25, at 29; see also Taylor, supra note 6, at 104–06 (“Arguably, it 
should be acceptable for the lower courts to follow Supreme Court advice—even in dictum—given 
the Court’s role as the final arbiter on open questions of federal law and the strict limitations on its 
ability to resolve them, notwithstanding their numerosity, variability, and complexity.”). 
 128. James E. Pfander, Jurisdiction-Stripping and the Supreme Court’s Power to Supervise 
Inferior Tribunals, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1433, 1451 (2000) (“The text of Article III confirms both the 
idea of judicial independence and the notion that a single supreme court was to exercise supervisory 
authority over any inferior tribunals that Congress chose to create.”). 
 129. Grove, supra note 81, at 8–9 (arguing for a “maximalist” Supreme Court with “effective 
means of communicating its views on federal law to the lower courts—at least within its sphere of 
appellate jurisdiction”). Grove also criticized Chief Justice Roberts’s minimalist approach to 
judging, including his analogy of judges to baseball umpires (stating that judges, like umpires, 
“don’t make the rules, they apply them”), asserting that “judges frequently make rules of law in the 
course of adjudication.” Id. at 2–3; see also Posner, supra note 125, at 34–35 (distinguishing 
between “aggressive” and “modest” “political judging” and arguing for the Court to be “a pragmatic 
decision maker of the ‘modest’ kind”). 
 130. The Supreme Court is arguably the court most likely to issue preemptive dicta. See, e.g., 
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163–66 (1973); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 
802–03 (1973); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467–74 (1966). And dicta creating this type of 
“prophylactic remedy” in general are the focus of this Article. See Foster Calhoun Johnson, Judicial 
Magic: The Use of Dicta as Equitable Remedy, 46 U.S.F. L. REV. 883, 902 (2012); see also People 
v. Williams, 788 N.E.2d 1126, 1136 (Ill. 2003) (quoting the dissenting opinion of the lower court 
judge questioning “why the Supreme Court bothered to publish the dicta that we have decided to 
ignore”). This practice has been criticized even by members of the Court, however, including 
Justices Stewart, Douglas, Brennan, and Marshall, who commented that: “Having determined that 
Florida’s current pretrial detention procedures are constitutionally inadequate, I think it is 
unnecessary to go further by way of dicta. In particular, I would not, in the abstract, attempt to 
specify those procedural protections that constitutionally need not be accorded incarcerated 
suspects awaiting trial.” Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 126 (1975) (Stewart, J., concurring); see 
also Leval, supra note 1, at 1274 (arguing that the Supreme Court “is but a court” and it “may make 
law only in the ways in which a court may make law”; hence, “the Supreme Court’s dicta are not 
law”). Because of their role as a policy-making court in ways the lower courts (and even state 
supreme courts) are not, however, judicial efficiency dicta issued by the United States Supreme 
Court is exempted from this Article. 
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C.  The Need for Judicial Efficiency 
Judicial efficiency is important. Judges are overworked. Federal 
courts of appeal, for example, “are in a long-term crisis of volume.”131 
Data from federal and state courts demonstrate that although caseloads 
fluctuate, the workload for federal and state judges is high.132 
The structure of our judicial system includes a number of features 
that promote judicial efficiency. Stare decisis, for example, creates 
efficiency in the judicial process.133 In addition to ensuring 
consistency and fairness, resolving cases the same way prior cases 
have been resolved can save time and resources. Similarly, courts of 
appeal are designed to be efficient; those courts do not retry cases, but 
instead defer to judges or juries on fact findings and generally review 
only questions of law.134 
And within these confines, a number of mechanisms contribute to 
a more efficient process—even if leading to a less accurate outcome. 
For example, waiver rules prohibit litigants from appealing issues not 
raised below.135 More significantly, the “harmless error” doctrine 
allows state and federal courts to ignore clear mistakes in the court 
below136 for the sake of efficiency.137 This is arguably true even in 
 
 131. Shay Lavie, Appellate Courts and Caseload Pressure, 27 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 57, 58–
59 (2016) (pointing out that “in the last few decades there has been ‘a 500% increase in filings, and 
a 77% increase in judgeships’”). Increasing court dockets, especially in the federal courts, has been 
a concern for many years. See, e.g., Harry T. Edwards, The Rising Work Load and Perceived 
“Bureaucracy” of the Federal Courts: A Causation-Based Approach to the Search for Appropriate 
Remedies, 68 IOWA L. REV. 871, 877 (1983). 
 132. See, e.g., CHIEF JUSTICE JOHN G. ROBERTS, JR., 2018 YEAR-END REPORT ON THE 
FEDERAL JUDICIARY 13 (2018), https://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/year-end/2018year-
endreport.pdf (noting that “[c]ivil case filings in the U.S. district courts rose six percent” and 
criminal filings “increased 13 percent”); ARIZ. SUP. CT., COURT ANNUAL CASE ACTIVITY: 
NARRATIVE SUMMARY 1 (2019), https://www.azcourts.gov/Portals/39/2018DR/SWCaseActivity.
pdf?ver=2019-08-07-151218-403 (noting that from 2017 to 2018, “[c]ase filings in Arizona’s 
courts increased by 2.2%”). 
 133. See, e.g., Schauer, Precedent, supra note 2, at 599–601 (noting that “when a rule external 
to the decisionmaker compels reliance on the decisions of others, it frees the decisionmaker from 
these responsibilities” and he or she “may justifiably ‘relax,’ in the sense of engaging in less 
scrutiny of the case”; “the net product will be a substantial reduction in decisionmaking effort” and, 
“[i]n this respect, efficiency may justify a rule of precedent”). 
 134. See supra notes 113–20 and accompanying text. 
 135. LLEWELLYN, supra note 25, at 38. 
 136. See, e.g., William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal Procedure and 
Criminal Justice, 107 YALE L.J. 1, 14 (1997) (pointing out that “even when defendants win on the 
merits of the claim, they can lose cases if appellate courts find errors harmless”). 
 137. See, e.g., Charles S. Chapel, The Irony of Harmless Error, 51 OKLA. L. REV. 501, 502 
(1998) (noting the purposes of the doctrine are: “(1) to preserve judicial resources, and (2) to 
preserve and protect public confidence in our justice system”). Chapel argues that “[i]t is not 
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criminal cases when the error is of a constitutional nature;138 as long 
as the evidence aside from the error “establishes guilt, the error is said 
not to have affected the verdict and it is therefore harmless.”139 
The dramatic rise in unpublished opinions has been another 
significant move toward judicial efficiency,140 but not without 
controversy.141 The use of law clerks to assist judges and even draft 
judicial opinions142 is another efficient, but sometimes controversial, 
practice.143 And political difficulty in appointing federal judges at 
various points in our nation’s history has not helped the situation;144 
 
uncommon for an appellate court to acknowledge multiple errors in a single trial and conclude each 
is harmless because the record established guilt.” Id. at 505. 
 138. Id. at 503–04 (arguing that the Supreme Court has shifted “the emphasis of the analysis 
under the harmless error rule away from the error and towards the guilt of the accused,” and the 
Court considers the “due process requirement of a fair trial” met, “notwithstanding serious trial 
error, if the record indicates evidence of guilt”). But see Daniel Epps, Harmless Errors and 
Substantial Rights, 131 HARV. L. REV. 2117, 2119 (2018) (pointing out that “[j]udges and 
commentators sharply disagree about which (and even whether) constitutional errors can be 
harmless”). 
 139. Chapel, supra note 137, at 504. 
 140. See, e.g., David C. Vladeck & Mitu Gulati, Judicial Triage: Reflections on the Debate 
over Unpublished Opinions, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1667, 1673 (2005) (noting that the “debate 
over publication and citation practices will not ebb until the root problem of the workload of our 
appellate courts is better understood and addressed”); Robert J. Martineau, Restrictions on 
Publication and Citation of Judicial Opinions: A Reassessment, 28 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 119, 
119 (1994) (pointing out that “[i]n response to the ‘crisis of volume,’ state and federal appellate 
courts have been restricting the opinions they write” to those that establish, “expand, alter, or 
modify” a rule of law; “involve a legal issue of continuing public interest;” “criticize existing law;” 
or “resolve a conflict of authority”; opinions that do not meet these requirements “are limited to 
brief statements of the reasons for the decision, go unpublished, and generally carry a prohibition 
against their being cited as precedent”). 
 141. Martineau, supra note 140, at 119 (summarizing the criticisms as “loss of judicial 
accountability, the difficulties of appellate review, the problems of predicting precedential value, 
the inequalities of parties’ access to unpublished opinions, and the illusory nature of the claims of 
judicial and litigant economy”). 
 142. See, e.g., Albert Yoon, Law Clerks and the Institutional Design of the Federal Judiciary, 
98 MARQ. L. REV. 131, 143–44 (2014) (arguing that due to workload increases, judges are relying 
more heavily on their clerks); Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, Which Judges Write Their 
Opinions (and Should We Care)?, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1077, 1081 (2005) (pointing out that 
many believe law clerks draft the majority of opinions and some judges draft their own, and that 
either way, the “production of judicial opinions is a joint venture between the judges and their 
staffs—for purposes of opinion writing, the law clerks”). 
 143. See, e.g., Todd C. Peppers et al., Inside Judicial Chambers: How Federal District Court 
Judges Select and Use Their Law Clerks, 71 ALB. L. REV. 623, 629 (2008) (“Other authors, 
however, have challenged the clerkship institution on the ground that it permits law clerks to 
exercise too much control over the legal process. Challengers to this institutional practice argue 
that law clerks are writing judicial opinions and wielding an inappropriate level of influence over 
judicial outcomes.”). 
 144. See generally Carl Tobias, Senate Gridlock and Federal Judicial Selection, 88 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 2233, 2234 (2013) (noting that the federal bench “appointments predicament” is 
caused by “the persistent vacancies dilemma” caused by “soaring dockets” and the political battle 
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almost 10 percent of the Article III federal judgeships are currently 
vacant.145 
In light of this need for efficiency, it is not surprising that judges 
occasionally espouse dicta in an attempt to avoid reconsidering issues 
at a later date, even when disposing of those issues is not necessary to 
resolve the actual matter before the court. Judicial efficiency dicta, on 
some level, make sense. After all, when an issue arises over and over 
and the lower courts continue to miss the mark, it is much easier to 
simply advise them how to hit the target than to draft opinion after 
opinion explaining how they erred.146 Similarly, when a case is likely 
to return, it may be more efficient to explicitly address all of the 
potential issues when they are first raised than to wait until they are all 
germane to the case’s ultimate outcome. Federal judges are even 
instructed to consider including this guidance for efficiency 
reasons.147 
In both instances, the impulse to preserve scarce judicial 
resources and rule on the non-dispositive issues is completely 
understandable. After all, the issues are fresh in the judges’ minds, and 
the court actually considered them; this is not simply obiter dicta.148 
Furthermore, in the appellate context, there is something incredibly 
unsatisfying about being able to say the lower court erred but not being 
 
resulting from “conflicting Republican and Democratic control of the White House and Senate that 
commenced about a quarter century ago”). 
 145. Current Judicial Vacancies, U.S. COURTS, https://www.uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/ 
judicial-vacancies/current-judicial-vacancies (last visited Nov. 22, 2020) (noting that there were 
eighty-one total vacancies in the Federal Judiciary on Feb. 5, 2020; the number of vacancies 
changes frequently, of course). 
 146. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 256 F.3d 895, 914 (9th Cir. 2001) (noting in an opinion 
by Judge Kozinski that appellate courts “often confront cases raising multiple issues that could be 
dispositive, yet they find it appropriate to resolve several, in order to avoid repetition of errors on 
remand or provide guidance for future cases”). 
 147. FED. JUD. CTR., JUDICIAL WRITING MANUAL: A POCKET GUIDE FOR JUDGES 17 (2d ed. 
2013). The manual explicitly states: 
Issues not necessary to the decision but seriously raised by the losing party should 
be discussed only to the extent necessary to show that they have been considered. 
The line between what is necessary to the decision and what is not, however, is not 
always clear. Occasionally, a full explanation of the rationale for a decision may be 
enhanced by discussion of matters not strictly a part of the holding. Moreover, a 
judge may find it efficient to address issues not necessary to the decision if the judge 
can thereby provide useful guidance for the lower court on remand. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
 148. See supra notes 24–32 and accompanying text. 
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able to dictate what the court should do to “get it right.”149 Yet courts 
should exercise restraint and avoid taking that approach,150 primarily 
because of the effects of judicial efficiency dicta. 
III.  THE REAL PROBLEM WITH JUDICIAL EFFICIENCY DICTA: 
PREEMPTION 
Judicial efficiency dictum suffers from the same problems as 
other types of dictum: it exceeds the court’s authority, and it is less 
likely to be correct.151 But the real problem with judicial efficiency 
dictum is that it is “preemptive dictum”—it is essentially binding in 
future proceedings, which upsets the roles of the courts and interrupts 
the natural development of the law. This is true for two main reasons. 
First, judicial efficiency dicta are difficult to identify as dicta, making 
it far more likely that subsequent courts will follow that dicta because 
the language appears to be binding rather than simply persuasive. 
Second, even when a subsequent court identifies the statements as 
dicta, courts are very likely to follow them because others may have 
relied on the dicta; courts are likely to defer to a higher court’s 
pronouncements, even when those statements are dicta; and judges 
attempt to minimize having their rulings reversed. 
 
 149. Stinson, supra note 1, at 230–31 (“When writing an opinion explaining how a party, 
especially a repeat player like the government, got it ‘wrong,’ it makes some sense to explain what 
they could have done to get it ‘right’ to avoid repeatedly litigating the issue. Because the case where 
they got it ‘right’ is not actually before the court, however, the court’s opinions about permissible 
conduct are dicta.”). 
 150. Johnson, 256 F.3d at 920 (Tashima, C.J., concurring) (criticizing Judge Kozinski’s 
characterization of a rule “unnecessary to our disposition of the case” as holding, and instead 
identifying it as non-binding dictum). Judge Tashima points out that this definition of dictum 
“reflects the centuries-long development of the common law”; Judge Kozinski’s view that the 
accepted approach is “difficult” ignores the “wholly subjective and completely unworkable 
standard of ‘deliberate’ and ‘due consideration’ versus ‘casual,’” resulting in “no standard at all.” 
Id. (citations omitted); see also Alcoa Inc. v. Bonneville Power Admin., 698 F.3d 774, 796 (9th 
Cir. 2012) (Tashima, C. J., concurring) (stating Tashima’s views on dicta “are adequately set forth 
in my concurring opinion in Johnson”); Spears v. Stewart, 283 F.3d 992, 1005 (9th Cir. 2002) 
(Kozinski, J., statement) (arguing that “there can be very good reasons to resolve issues that, after 
all is said and done, turn out not to have been strictly necessary to the outcome,” including “judicial 
efficiency and stability” in order to save “future judges and litigants the burden and uncertainty of 
ploughing the same legal ground”). 
 151. See supra notes 60–96 and accompanying text. 
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A.  Difficult to Identify 
The difficulty distinguishing between holding and dicta in the 
first place means judges may not even recognize the problem.152 Quite 
often, litigants and courts can easily recognize traditional obiter dicta 
as an aside that has no controlling effect. In those circumstances, dicta 
have no real effect. 
Judicial efficiency dicta, on the other hand, are much harder to 
identify, primarily because they are often considered.153 When a court 
spends ample time discussing an issue and the opinion includes 
statements that look like rules, subsequent courts are not likely to 
identify this language as dictum that they can choose to follow or not 
follow. Furthermore, the court espousing the dictum can create 
confusion with carefully constructed language;154 the court in the 
Rannels case did exactly that155 by prefacing the dictum with “I thus 
hold”156 and engaging in a thorough discussion of the scope of the 
ADA—despite dismissing that claim.157 
Workload pressures can also contribute to this result.158 Judges 
are busy and parsing through each relevant opinion with the level of 
detail necessary to distinguish holding from dictum is difficult.159 This 
is complicated even further when law clerks, as opposed to the judges, 
are conducting most of the research and potentially creating first drafts 
 
 152. Leval, supra note 1, at 1253 (“What is problematic is not the utterance of dicta, but the 
failure to distinguish between holding and dictum.”). 
 153. See supra notes 26–32 and accompanying text. 
 154. Bradley Scott Shannon, The Retroactive and Prospective Application of Judicial 
Decisions, 26 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 811, 849 (2003). Shannon points out that the real problem 
occurs when “what is actually dicta is announced as if it were holding.” Id. Despite it being 
“understandable that a judge might want to announce such prospective rules of law, as such 
statements might then appear to have the force of law. . . . there are dangers in according dicta the 
status of holding that relate to the reasons courts recognize a distinction between holding and dicta 
in the first instance.” Id. 
 155. Rannels v. Hargrove, 731 F. Supp. 1214, 1221 (E.D. Pa. 1990). 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. 
 158. See supra notes 131–32 and accompanying text. 
 159. Leval, supra note 1, at 1269 (“Determining whether a statement of law is holding or dictum 
can be a time-consuming task. You must read the full opinion, understand what were the facts, what 
question was in dispute, how the court resolved it, and what role the proposition played in justifying 
the judgment.”). Judge Leval then pointed out that it is “[f]ar easier to have the magic carpet of 
computer research whisk you straight to the pertinent sentence of the prior opinion and to write, ‘In 
such and such case, the court held . . . . ’ We do it unaware.” Id.; see also supra note 23 and 
accompanying text (noting that “distinguishing between holding and dictum is easier in theory than 
in practice”). 
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of the opinions.160 Ironically, the need for judicial efficiency dicta in 
the first place is one of the main reasons this dictum is so problematic. 
And although the litigant who would be harmed by the dicta has 
an incentive to identify it as such and raise that issue with the court, it 
requires far more work on the lawyer’s part to adequately determine 
whether the statement is, in fact, dicta. The overemphasis lawyers 
place on words and phrases to the exclusion of legal principles161 
means this will not happen as often as it should. 
B.  Treated as Binding Even When Identified 
Even when a court actually identifies judicial efficiency dictum 
as dicta, that language is still likely to be followed and therefore 
control the subsequent dispute. This is true for three reasons: first, 
reliance interests create incentives for courts to follow the earlier dicta; 
second, lower courts often defer significantly to higher courts’ 
statements and perceived preferences; and third, the fear of reversal 
will likely prevent subsequent courts from disregarding the dicta, even 
if that court would rule to the contrary in the absence of that dicta. 
1.  Reliance 
Lawyers and their clients rely on statements in judicial 
opinions,162 especially when those statements appear to be thoughtful 
and look like case holdings. Hence, the parties in a subsequent case 
may have relied on judicial efficiency dicta espoused by a previous 
 
 160. Yoon, supra note 142, at 143–44 (noting that judges’ increased reliance on law clerks 
gives clerks “an increasing role in the development of the common law”). Law clerks, who are 
generally inexperienced recent law school graduates, will likely have more difficulty than judges 
identifying dicta; they may also, in their role as opinion drafters, include more dicta in judicial 
opinions in the first place. 
 161. Stinson, supra note 1, at 222. 
 162. See, e.g., Randy J. Kozel, The Scope of Precedent, 113 MICH. L. REV. 179, 216 (2014) 
(pointing out that reliance can manifest itself “in terms of public expectations or private 
decisionmaking (or both)” and noting that “[s]takeholders may make forward-looking decisions” 
based on both holdings and dicta (footnotes omitted)); Jack M. Beermann, Crisis? What Crisis?, 
80 NW. U. L. REV. 1383, 1387–88 (1986) (reviewing RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: 
CRISIS AND REFORM (1985)) (asserting that lawyers should be able to rely on the “broad holdings” 
of judicial opinions and that those opinions should “reflect the views of the judges” so that they can 
“provide an accurate gauge for lawyers to predict what the court is likely to do in the next case”; 
Beermann also remarks that “[u]npredictability in the law creates additional costs, as parties pay 
more in legal fees for lawyers to construct their transactions and purchase insurance against more 
possible problems”). 
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court,163 especially because it may be difficult to identify the prior 
statements as dicta.164 This reliance suggests that courts, when 
deciding a current case, should consider the parties’ reliance on 
previous dicta “even if the precedent court’s decision was (in the 
constrained court’s view) incorrect, and even if the precedent court 
had no authority to lay down general rules binding on future courts.”165 
Just as this reliance value suggests judges should avoid overturning 
existing precedent even when the rule no longer appears correct,166 the 
same underlying expectation concerns suggest judges should follow 
language in prior opinions, even if not binding, when others have 
relied on that language.167 Consistency and dependability are often 
treated as more important than reaching the “right” outcome. 
In the Kelly example above,168 future litigants will likely expect 
New Jersey trial courts to follow the New Jersey Supreme Court’s 
dicta in terms of the scope of permissible testimony about the battered-
woman’s syndrome.169 This is true even though the trial court in Kelly 
never permitted the expert witness to testify about the battered-
woman’s syndrome,170 and hence, the New Jersey Supreme Court had 
no facts before it about the scope of permissible testimony. Future 
courts are still likely to feel constrained to meet those expectations. 
This “reliance value”171 results in the previous dicta binding future 
decisions.172 
 
 163. See, e.g., Alexander, supra note 15, at 14 (“[R]ational people will take into account the 
precedent court’s decision and its opinion in predicting what other courts will do. Thus, some 
people, despite the lack of any formal practice of precedent following, will justifiably rely on the 
precedent court’s opinion and will modify their behavior in response to it.”); Kozel, supra note 162, 
at 216 (“[I]f protecting reliance expectations can furnish practical benefits, those expectations 
should not be dismissed as inapposite merely because they attached to a passage that might 
technically be defined as dicta.”). 
 164. See supra notes 153–61 and accompanying text. 
 165. Alexander, supra note 15, at 14. 
 166. Dorf, supra note 1, at 2004. 
 167. Kozel, supra note 162, at 186 (noting that even when a judge is “quite confident that the 
applicable precedent is incorrect,” he or she “may still choose to abide by the precedent based on 
her belief that overruling it would create substantial transition costs and upset settled 
expectations”). 
 168. See supra notes 34–43 and accompanying text. 
 169. See supra notes 41–42 and accompanying text. 
 170. State v. Kelly, 478 A.2d 364, 368 (N.J. 1984). 
 171. Alexander, supra note 15, at 13 (describing the limitations this places on the court and 
defining reliance value as “the value of fulfilling expectations on which people have acted 
otherwise to their detriment”). 
 172. Id. (“If the decision in the precedent case has generated expectations of similar future 
decisions on which people have relied . . . and a decision that the constrained court would otherwise 
(11) 54.2_STINSON.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/23/21  9:53 AM 
614 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54:587 
The reliance concern is even stronger within the same case.173 In 
addition to the judge being unlikely to spend much time reconsidering 
a ruling he or she has already made, even the judge lacked the 
authority to pronounce the rule in the first instance,174 the parties have 
relied on the statement. Consider the Rannels example above.175 In 
that case, the court concluded in dicta that the ADA prohibits reverse 
discrimination by protecting the young as well as the old but dismissed 
the claim.176 If the plaintiff could successfully meet the procedural 
requirements and refile, he could reasonably expect that his case 
would not be dismissed on the grounds that the statute does not protect 
him as a younger person. And even if the judge subsequently realized 
the earlier conclusions were incorrect—perhaps because they were not 
essential to the case’s outcome, so they had not been thoroughly 
debated—he cannot now rule to the contrary because the parties in that 
case have justifiably relied on that earlier dicta. 
2.  Deference to a Higher Court 
Lower courts inherently defer to higher courts177 because of the 
structure of our judicial system.178 This “hierarchical influence”179 
means that, not surprisingly, trial court judges are most deferential.180 
Stare decisis—of course—requires deference to holdings issued by 
 
find correct would dash those expectations, then the opposite decision may in fact be the correct 
one.”); Kozel, supra note 162, at 216. 
 173. Alexander, supra note 15, at 13 (arguing that this reliance value is especially strong when 
“the parties now litigating before the constrained court were among those who relied” (emphasis 
added)). 
 174. This is true for two reasons: judicial efficiency, and because the judge may erroneously 
believe he or she had the authority to make the holding in the first place, as it appears the judge in 
the Rannels case believed when prefacing the dictum with “I thus hold.” Rannels v. Hargrove, 731 
F. Supp. 1214, 1221 (E.D. Pa. 1990). 
 175. See supra notes 46–55 and accompanying text. 
 176. Rannels, 731 F. Supp. at 1220–21. 
 177. See, e.g., Boyd, supra note 113, at 114–15 (arguing that, in the federal court context, 
“district judges are greatly affected in their decision making by their place at the bottom of the 
federal judicial hierarchy and their role as agent to their courts of appeals’ colleagues”). 
 178. See, e.g., Susan B. Haire et al., Appellate Court Supervision in the Federal Judiciary: A 
Hierarchical Perspective, 37 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 143, 146 (2003) (arguing that, as agents of the 
higher courts, lower courts attempt to discern higher courts’ policy preferences); see also supra 
notes 99–120 and accompanying text (describing the tiered structure of the state and federal 
judiciary). 
 179. Boyd, supra note 113, at 115–20. 
 180. Haire et al., supra note 178, at 147 (“[G]iven the circuit’s ability to supervise and correct 
district court judgments, the influence of vertical stare decisis, and the modest sanction associated 
with reversal (and remand), district court judges will often conform their decisions to circuit court 
preferences.”); Boyd, supra note 113, at 115. 
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higher courts.181 But lower courts also appear to be motivated to defer 
to higher courts’ policy preferences, even when not directly required 
by binding precedent.182 
The use of dictum to signal those preferences results in lower 
courts generally deferring to those statements.183 Some scholars argue 
that lower court judges affirmatively ought to rely on “well-considered 
dicta” from higher courts because those statements offer “extremely 
probative evidence” of the higher court’s “likely future ruling,” and 
following this language will promote “hierarchy values.”184 In an 
attempt to discern the practical effect of higher court dicta on lower 
court decision making, Professors Klein and Devins conducted an 
empirical study of lower courts’ use of the holding/dictum distinction 
and concluded that “lower courts cede much of their common law 
power to higher courts.”185 The authors attribute the results of their 
 
 181. See, e.g., Dorf, supra note 1, at 2025 (explaining that under principles of vertical stare 
decisis, a “lower court must always follow a higher court’s precedents” and pointing out that 
horizontal stare decisis, where courts must follow their own precedents, is “extremely complex” 
(emphasis omitted)); Michael Sinclair, Precedent, Super-Precedent, 14 GEO. MASON L. REV. 363, 
369–70 (2007). 
 182. See, e.g., Evan H. Caminker, Precedent and Prediction: The Forward-Looking Aspects of 
Inferior Court Decisionmaking, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1, 1, 7 (1994) (arguing that “lower courts in the 
judicial hierarchy” should generally “interpret various data to predict how their superior court 
would decide the same matter” and then “defer to predicted future superior court rulings”); Haire 
et al., supra note 178, at 145–49. 
 183. Klein & Devins, Dicta, Schmicta, supra note 3, at 2048 (arguing that “the distinction 
between holding and dictum is at once central to the American legal system and largely irrelevant”; 
although “[l]awyers, judges, and academics refer to ‘dicta’ and ‘dictum’ all the time,” in practice, 
“lower courts appear quite reluctant to rest decisions on the ground that dictum is not holding when 
it really matters”). The authors conclude that the holding/dictum distinction has less importance in 
practice than in theory because lower courts appear to regularly follow higher-court dicta. Id.; see 
also Leval, supra note 1, at 1250 (“We judges regularly undertake to promulgate law through 
utterance of dictum made to look like a holding-in disguise, so to speak. . . . Also, we accept dictum 
uttered in a previous opinion as if it were binding law, which governs our subsequent 
adjudication.”). 
 184. Caminker, supra note 182, at 66–67. Professor Dorf seems to share this view at least partly, 
noting that because the distinction between holding and dictum is not clear, “declaring a prior 
statement dictum is quite similar to overruling a previously established legal principle.” Dorf, supra 
note 1, at 2027. He then points out the predicament lower court judges find themselves in:  
Thus, a lower court judge may experience cognitive dissonance when faced with 
an argument that a higher court’s statement is dictum. In one sense, the lower court 
judge is asked only to say what the law is (or, more precisely, what it is not). This 
she may freely do. Yet the judge recognizes that in another sense she is being asked 
to overrule a principle of law established by a higher court, which she lacks the 
power to do. This tension may underlie the disagreement about whether a lower 
court must follow a higher court’s dicta. 
Id. 
 185. Klein & Devins, Dicta, Schmicta, supra note 3, at 2021. Klein and Devins also noted that 
this was “true regardless of whether lower courts voluntarily embrace dicta or follow it 
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study, “at least partially, to frequent decisions to abide by statements 
from higher courts even though they are recognized as dicta.”186 The 
authors then point out the broader impact of this phenomenon: 
In making these decisions, judges profoundly affect 
hierarchical dynamics in courts. They also shape the way in 
which law is produced and developed in the judicial system 
as a whole. They move the legal system away from the 
shared, incremental decision making envisioned in 
traditional conceptions of common law judging and by 
contemporary minimalists, and they enable bold law making 
dominated by higher courts.187 
This deference can be extreme. Some courts go so far as to “take 
the position that all considered statements of a higher court are 
binding.”188 Not all lower courts hold this view, of course, but even 
when concluding the prior statements are dicta and not binding, 
subsequent courts often defer nonetheless.189 
Designating an opinion as “unpublished”190 can reduce the 
reliance on judicial efficiency dicta; that designation signals the case 
is not intended to be binding,191 and the court may have spent less time 
considering the issues.192 Virtually all state supreme court opinions are 
published, however.193 And even when an intermediate appellate court 
 
unwillingly.” Id. at 2044; see also Leval, supra note 1, at 1250 (“[Dicta] are no longer ignored. 
Judges do more than put faith in them; they are often treated as binding law.”). 
 186. Klein & Devins, Dicta, Schmicta, supra note 3, at 2044. 
 187. Id. 
 188. Dorf, supra note 1, at 2026. 
 189. See id. at 2026 n.107. 
 190. See, e.g., K.K. DuVivier, Are Some Words Better Left Unpublished?: Precedent and the 
Role of Unpublished Decisions, 3 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 397, 397–98 (2001) (noting that, in 
2001, the “selective designation of some opinions as unpublished is a fairly recent phenomenon for 
courts” but that even twenty years ago, “almost every circuit court, and many of the state 
intermediate level appellate courts across the country, use unpublished opinions extensively to 
handle heavy caseloads efficiently”). The vast majority of federal intermediate appellate opinions 
are now unpublished. See, e.g., Elizabeth Earle Beske, Rethinking the Nonprecedential Opinion, 
65 UCLA L. REV. 808, 810 (2018); see also Ben Grunwald, Strategic Publication, 92 TUL. L. REV. 
745, 753–58 (2018). 
 191. See, e.g., Boyd, supra note 113, at 119. 
 192. See, e.g., Jessie Allen, Just Words? The Effects of No-Citation Rules in Federal Courts of 
Appeals, 29 VT. L. REV. 555, 557–58 (2005) (noting that judges “respond to heavy case loads that 
make it impossible for appellate judges to issue careful and detailed written opinions in every case 
they decide” by using “summary procedures for deciding routine cases, often providing 
explanations of those decisions via lightly edited memos written by clerks and staff attorneys”). 
 193. Joshua M. Silverstein, Using the West Key Number System as a Data Collection and 
Coding Device for Empirical Legal Scholarship, 34 J.L. & COM. 203, 286 n.443 (2016). 
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opinion is designated as “unpublished,” it can often still be cited.194 
And more importantly, it still signals the court’s position. Hence, 
lower courts may still be inclined to follow that dicta out of deference 
to a higher court. 
3.  Fear of Reversal 
Even when not inclined to defer to higher courts, lower courts will 
justifiably be loath to deviate from a higher court’s dicta because of 
the threat of reversal.195 Judges are human. They prefer to be right196 
and prefer to not have others point out when they may be wrong.197 
Judges are also often aware that being reversed can impact their 
opportunities for future advancement to a higher court.198 So this 
“threat of reversal by a higher court” acts as a “constraint” on 
judges.199 
 
 194. FED. R. APP. P. 32.1(a); see also Beske, supra note 190, at 810 (noting that, despite lacking 
“precedential effect,” “litigants can cite to these opinions”). 
 195. Dorf, supra note 1, at 2026 (“Because the higher court can reverse the lower court for the 
latter’s failure to predict the former’s legal views, the prudent lower court may choose to follow 
dicta as a way to avoid being overruled.”); Klein & Devins, Dicta, Schmicta, supra note 3, at 2044 
(“To the extent that judges follow dicta unwillingly, it is almost certainly because they wish to 
avoid being reversed by a higher court.”). 
 196. Haire et al., supra note 178, at 147 (“Many judges want to ‘get it right’ simply because 
they have internalized norms of stare decisis through their professional training and because judicial 
decisions must be rationalized on the basis of precedent . . . .”). 
 197. Reversals are not uncommon. A comprehensive study of state trial court decisions on 
appeal found that the “reversal rate for plaintiff appeals is 21.5 percent, compared with 41.5 percent 
for defendant appeals. The reversal rate for jury trials is 33.7 percent, compared with 27.5 percent 
for bench trials.” Theodore Eisenberg & Michael Heise, Plaintiphobia in State Courts? An 
Empirical Study of State Court Trials on Appeal, 38 J. LEGAL STUD. 121, 121 (2009). At the federal 
level, at least one scholar commented that the “most striking feature about appeals is the high rate 
of affirmance. Our work in a number of articles shows the affirmance rate for federal civil appeals 
to be about 80%.” Kevin M. Clermont, Litigation Realities Redux, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1919, 
1970 (2009). Even though this rate is higher than the state court affirmance rate, federal appellate 
courts are still reversing approximately one in every five cases. 
 198. Boyd, supra note 113, at 116; Haire et al., supra note 178, at 147 (“Frequent reversals 
could impede a judge’s ability to achieve these professional goals. Indeed, senatorial hearings often 
focus on the judge’s ‘track record’ in terms of affirmances and reversals, and thus judges interested 
in elevation may seek to conform their behavior to circuit court preferences . . . .”); see also Note, 
Courting Reversal: The Supervisory Role of State Supreme Courts, 87 YALE L.J. 1191, 1196 (1978) 
(noting that, in the state court context, a “reversal is a far more decisive repudiation of a lower 
court’s reasoning or conduct than a statement of disapproval in an affirming opinion that upholds 
the result of the lower court’s decision”). 
 199. EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 78, at 35; see, e.g., Caminker, supra note 182, at 5 (“Less 
visibly [than candidly explaining their prediction of the higher court’s likely ruling] but probably 
much more frequently, inferior court judges engage sub silentio in predictive reasoning concerning 
their superior court’s future behavior in an effort to avoid subsequent appellate reversal.”). 
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This is true even when a lower court is debating whether to follow 
language that is clearly dicta, as in cases like Kelly; in that case, the 
court was explicit that its statements regarding the appropriate scope 
of expert witness testimony were not necessary to the outcome of the 
case and that they were simply advice.200 The court prefaced the 
discussion with this: “Since a retrial is necessary, we think it advisable 
to indicate the limit of the expert’s testimony on this issue of 
reasonableness.”201 Despite not being technically required to follow 
this “advice” from a higher court, lower courts are unlikely to ignore 
it because, as noted by Justice Scalia in a 2010 concurring opinion: 
Despite the Court’s insistence that it is agnostic about the 
proper test . . . , lower courts will likely read the Court’s self-
described “instructive” expatiation . . . as a heavy-handed 
hint about how they should proceed. Litigants will do 
likewise . . . . In short, in saying why it is not saying more, 
the Court says much more than it should.202 
The reason dicta is followed so frequently has been described as 
“obvious”: “[J]udges across all courts do not like to be reversed, and 
statements of higher courts, even those made in dicta, are excellent 
indicators of how a higher court views an issue.”203 In sum, “[f]rom a 
practicing lawyer’s perspective, next to nothing can be gained by 
asking a lower court to treat higher court language as nonbinding 
dicta.”204 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
Despite courts’ best attempts at efficiency, the common law is 
simply not efficient—and it is not supposed to be. The principles 
underlying the common law, including stare decisis, require courts to 
follow the holdings of superior courts to promote predictability and 
 
 200. State v. Kelly, 478 A.2d 364, 378 (N.J. 1984). 
 201. Id. The same is true for the court’s discussion of the five additional issues that were 
“unnecessary to consider” in light of the court’s actual holding; the court prefaced that discussion 
by noting that “we dispose of them briefly to assist the trial court in the event they surface again at 
the new trial.” Id. at 382. 
 202. City of Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746, 768–69 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring) (emphasis 
omitted); see also Leval, supra note 1, at 1269 (suggesting courts “accept earlier dicta as holding” 
to avoid harsh reactions from higher courts for rejecting their pronouncements as dicta). 
 203. McAllister, supra note 7, at 178–79. 
 204. Klein & Devins, Dicta, Schmicta, supra note 3, at 2048. 
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fairness.205 And “the distinction between holding and dicta helps to 
prevent judges from evading the principle of stare decisis.”206 The law 
develops over time, case by case, and is tested with each new set of 
facts, new arguments, new data, and new policies. 
Judicial efficiency dicta create significant concerns. As with all 
forms of dicta, they exceed the court’s authority, and they are more 
likely to be incorrect, even if they are “considered.”207 Efficiency is a 
laudable goal, and it is therefore understandable that judges may be 
tempted to espouse judicial efficiency dicta. But because of its 
preemptive nature, dicta for judicial efficiency purposes undermine 
the basic precepts of our judicial system. This “preemptive dicta” cuts 
off the natural debate, arguments, and development of the law that are 
essential in our common law system. 
But how can we encourage courts to avoid addressing issues that 
they have considered but that are not necessary to the outcome of the 
case? One solution is for courts to follow a two-step process when 
drafting their opinions. The first step would be for the court to clearly 
articulate the proposed outcome of the case. The second step would be 
to draft a discussion that supports or justifies that action. If the opinion 
discusses an issue that is not necessary for the outcome the judge 
ultimately orders, that discussion should be deleted from the 
opinion.208 
So, for example, if a court decides to dismiss a case for lack of 
jurisdiction, the opinion should not include a discussion of the merits 
 
 205. Id. at 2031–32 (explaining that the “competing normative perspectives on judges’ role in 
the development of law imply different views of where the line between holding and dictum should 
be drawn. Judicial minimalists would likely embrace a narrower view of what constitutes a holding 
and, in so doing, categorize as dictum any language that is not necessary to the resolution of a 
dispute before the court.” Under the minimalist view, “lower courts have substantial authority to 
shape the development of law by enforcing the holding-dictum distinction and otherwise engage in 
common law judging. Formalists would likely prefer broad, authoritative judicial opinions and be 
more likely to treat such statements as part of the court’s holding. More fundamentally, formalists 
look for higher courts to lay down rules that will constrain the discretion of lower court judges”). 
 206. Abramowicz & Stearns, supra note 1, at 1093. 
 207. See supra notes 26–32 and accompanying text. 
 208. See, e.g., Leval, supra note 1, at 1268 (pointing out the problems that occur when courts 
assert no error as to some claims, yet reverse the judgment). If the judge wanted to keep a draft of 
that discussion for future efficiency, that judge could do so. This would be akin to a judge having 
a clerk research a legal issue that is not pressing in any current case. Many of the problems noted 
with judges espousing dicta disappear when that dicta are not part of the actual opinion. However, 
the discussion is still less likely to be accurate because it would not affect the outcome of the case, 
so that draft discussion should form only the starting point for a future opinion on that issue; see 
also supra notes 86–92 and accompanying text (discussing how dictum is more likely to be 
inaccurate than holdings). 
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of the plaintiff’s claim. Similarly, if a court decides to reverse a lower 
court’s decision, the opinion should not elaborate on how the lower 
court did not err on other issues. Simply stating that those issues are 
not necessary for the decision should suffice. Alternative holdings 
would be permissible as long as they each resulted in the same 
result;209 if one “holding” would result in the case proceeding and 
another “holding” would result in the case being dismissed, the 
discussion should be limited to the reason for dismissal. 
In the Kelly210 case, the opinion would therefore be limited to 
explaining why the proposed expert testimony on battered-woman’s 
syndrome was relevant—the reasons that support the outcome in that 
case, reversal—without providing guidance to the trial court on the 
parameters of that testimony once it is properly admitted.211 And in 
the Rannels case, the court’s opinion relative to the ADA claim would 
address only the reasons for dismissal—failure to exhaust 
administrative remedies and lack of subject-matter jurisdiction over 
the named defendant, an alternative holding supporting the same 
result.212 The discussion claiming to hold that the act prohibits reverse 
age discrimination would be eliminated.213 
Telling an appellate court that it can only say what the lower court 
did wrong, without explaining to the lower court how to do it “right,” 
is, of course, both unsatisfying and inefficient. But that is exactly what 
our common law requires. And the result is far more likely, in the end, 
to be correct. Otherwise, “dicta-planting will continue because 
particular persuasive dictum . . . can render additional decisions 
unnecessary, an efficient outcome for the issuing court.”214 
It seems counter-intuitive to think of judicial efficiency dicta as 
one of the most problematic forms of dicta. After all, the court likely 
considered the issue, and judicial efficiency is a worthwhile goal. Yet 
as with all forms of dicta, judicial efficiency dicta still exceed courts’ 
authority and are more likely than actual holdings to be incorrect. 
 
 209. See supra note 22 and accompanying text. 
 210. See notes 34–43 and accompanying text (describing the Kelly case). 
 211. State v. Kelly, 478 A.2d 364, 378 (N.J. 1984); see also supra notes 41–42 and 
accompanying text (describing the Kelly case dictum). 
 212. Rannels v. Hargrove, 731 F. Supp. 1214, 1221–23 (E.D. Pa. 1990); see also supra notes 
50–54 (describing the Rannels case). 
 213. Rannels, 731 F. Supp. at 1220–21; see also supra notes 51–53 and accompanying text 
(discussing the Rannels case). 
 214. McAllister, supra note 7, at 180. 
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Judicial efficiency dicta are also difficult to identify, and even when 
lower courts recognize a statement as dictum, they generally treat it 
like a holding anyway.215 Hence, because this particular form of dicta 
is more likely to become binding than other forms of dicta, judicial 
efficiency dicta are actually a significant problem. This “preemptive 
dicta” dislodges the role of the various courts216 and stifles the natural 
debate and arguments that are necessary for the considered 
development of the law.217 Advocacy is less robust because the result 
is predetermined. We are far better off allowing natural splits in the 
law, with different arguments and approaches; that is how we get to 



















 215. See supra notes 152–204 and accompanying text. 
 216. See, e.g., Grove, supra note 81, at 25 (noting that broad reaching decisions by higher courts 
can “inhibit development of new legal theories in the lower courts and thereby undermine their 
capacity to serve as informational resources” for the higher court); Abramowicz & Stearns, supra 
note 1, at 1022–23. 
 217. Grove, supra note 81, at 6 (noting that the minimalist approach leaves “room for 
democratic debate on those issues”). Furthermore, this approach recognizes that it is the 
legislature’s prerogative to set policy going forward, not the courts; for example, the New Jersey 
legislature could have held hearings and heard from a broad array of relevant stakeholders and 
reached a conclusion about the appropriateness of expert testimony on the battered-woman’s 
syndrome, similar to rape shield laws enacted in many jurisdictions. Currently, a “number of states 
provide for the admission of the battered woman syndrome through legislation.” 2 DAVID L. 
FAIGMAN ET AL., MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT 
TESTIMONY § 12:1 n.3 (2019–2020 ed. 2019). 
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